

THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

NORMAL VARIATIONS IN THE SENSE OF REALITY.

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Observations on the loss of the sense of reality have usually been restricted to pathological cases. From the results obtained by questioning healthy people; from references found in works of fiction and autobiography; above all, from my own experience, I am convinced that fluctuations in the sense of reality are, within certain limits, common and that a report on such normal variations might be of value. To this end I have watched somewhat closely my own experiences, with results which no doubt other observers could parallel somewhat in detail; although as individuals we find the predicates real and unreal attaching themselves to certain phases of experience with apparent arbitrariness — to what confusion of the philosopher!

To begin with, how, from the introspective standpoint, shall the feeling of reality be defined? It is, as it were, psychical solidity; not merely vividness of experience but, rather, density of experience, whether that experience be perceptual, ratiocinative, or emotional. With the loss of the sense of reality, tangibility and meaning evaporate from experience.

In my own experience the feeling of reality rises and falls. In certain cases it is easy to refer the fluctuations to physical conditions. Lack of sleep reduces the feeling of reality; so too, in an even greater degree, does muscular fatigue of the eyes. Acute pain, on the other hand, raises the sense of reality, so much so that at times it is welcomed as a relief. Sleeplessness and eye-fatigue, to repeat, occasion a loss of the sense of reality; so too does emotional, but not mental or physical fatigue. At such times the external world seems to lack solidity; it awakens no interest; people appear as trees walking; thought moves sluggishly; indifference to the consequences of actions

ensues; consciousness of self ebbs. Loss of the sense of position I have never experienced except when rousing suddenly from sleep.

Certain sense stimulations produce a similar state, sometimes with abrupt suddenness, a state which vanishes as suddenly. The sound of a fly buzzing, the crowing of a rooster, the sound of hammering not only seem to lack solidity themselves but even swamp contemporaneous experiences in like unreality. The singing of a bird, on the other hand, heightens the sense of reality. The haze of an autumn day that makes objects seem far-off, immense, veiled, has the same effect upon mental experiences. Thoughts come slowly; emotions seem big, but not intense. The roar of a big city, the presence of a crowd of people reduces the sense of reality. The self seems to shrink and to lose interest. Solitude and grand or beautiful natural scenery raise the sense of reality to a high pitch.

Not only do sense stimulations bring on a feeling of unreality that extends from the sense world to the world of thought and emotion, but the reverse may happen. Prolonged reading or thinking on philosophical topics has the same results. Not only do conclusions seem to lack validity, but the world of daily experience also grows thin, dream-like. This state, which is rather unpleasant, seems more akin to emotional than to mental fatigue. Again, the reading of certain sorts of poetry, Yeats' for instance, or of such plays as Maeterlinck's reduces the sense of reality. Exertion seems unprofitable; the world, a shadow-world; people, charming but not vital fictions. This state is languorously pleasant.

Reactions from intense emotional excitement occasion a loss of the feeling of reality. A dreaded ordeal, if long anticipated, brings on such a reaction. The feeling of indifference to results that ensues is in my own case distinctly valuable, since it does away with self-consciousness and fear of consequences.

The predicate of unreality has attached itself to certain things in a seemingly arbitrary and uncomfortable way. A voice over a telephone has no body, messages so received make no impression upon me. Again, letters written by myself seem unmeaning and futile. That a letter will reach its destination and convey my message is matter of reasoned conviction; but no feeling of reality attaches to a correspondence. Social invitations fail to convince, particularly if given orally. I always experience a feeling of surprised relief when I find that I didn't 'dream it.'

The sense of reality in dreams is for me not intense, as a usual thing. A dream has, however, given me the most poignant feeling of

reality I have ever experienced. This dream affected my waking mood for days afterward.

Related to the experiences described above as loss of the sense of reality and yet unlike them in certain respects is an experience that comes at long intervals. The underlying support of the universe, as it were, drops away; in religious terms, God ceases to exist for me. This state is not brought about by speculation; philosophical conclusions have nothing to do with it. At such times the objects of the external world seem unusually well-defined and brightly-illuminated; my thoughts, unusually clear and coherent. The state was last experienced on a hot Sunday afternoon when the wind was roaring in a most lively fashion. I fell into a deep sleep in which I seemed to be tossed on the wind as on ocean billows. When I awoke the sense of some great loss, of an unsupported universe, was upon me. The sharpening of objects and the acuteness of thought were noticeable.

Unfortunately, I can cite no experiments on sense or organic reactions made at the time when the mood of unreality is present. I am aware, however, that at such times sensory and motor automatisms manifest themselves. I sometimes, for instance, write verses half-mechanically or, even, philosophical squibs which represent no conscious process of reasoning.

That the sense of reality leaves those acts that one comes to perform more or less reflexly is a common experience. In teaching one often hears one's self talking without realizing what one is saying. One may stare a word out of countenance. It is also a common experience that reality fails to attach itself immediately to experiences so out of harmony with formed habits that consciousness cannot assimilate them. A great and sudden sorrow is not realized, as we say; neither is a sudden great joy. One would also be inclined to think that a life that obeys the promptings of instinct would take on a tinge of reality that with difficulty suffuses a life that violates the most deep-seated racial instincts.

In explanation of the feeling of unreality, the theory that we have to do merely with disorders of organic sensation does not seem wholly satisfactory, although it would seem that such disorders can induce such a state. The states are often so fleeting; or, again, the feeling attaches itself to certain objects in such a way that one doubts the possibility of an explanation solely on the ground of organic disturbance. Is it not possible that we have here to do with cases of diffused or distracted attention, which may be very variously conditioned?

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

FEELING AND EMOTION.

La Logique des Sentiments. TH. RIBOT. Paris, Felix Alcan. Pp. x + 200.

In this volume Ribot has expanded the papers already published in the *Revue Philosophique* for June and July, 1904, under the same name and reviewed by Gardiner in No. 12 of Vol I. of the *BULLETIN* and has added to them a chapter on 'L'Imagination Créatrice Affective' developed from his work *L'Imagination Créatrice*, reviewed by the present writer in the *PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW* for January, 1901.

We have before us therefore in complete form what, in contrast with the author's earlier work, *Psychologie des Sentiments*, may be described as his dynamics of feeling, and it is in this light, as a completion of his earlier work (see preface), that the author would have it considered. In view of the previous reviews referred to (to which the reader may turn for details) we shall confine ourselves to an estimate of the work as a whole.

The dynamic, functional point of view has been steadily gaining upon the analytical and descriptive in Ribot's recent work, and feeling is the dynamic moment. At a time when Wundt has been rewriting his psychology with a view to putting feeling at the center of his systematic analytical treatment, it is significant that the French psychologist, approaching as he does the subject with such different methods, has gradually been showing the primacy of feeling in regions formerly given over to intellectualism. Always disposed to emphasize the rôle of feeling as a determinant of associations, in these later works, he is concerned to show 'an influence of sensibility upon intelligence,' '*supérieure*,' which presupposes association but transcends it—types of continuity in which process is controlled by an immanent end where the end is wholly or almost wholly emotional, in other words a *logic* of the sentiments.

To Ribot's systematizing intelligence—and he is nothing, if not systematic—all those mental processes which by reason of their immanent continuity may be contrasted with association, are conceived as distributed in a number of classes between two opposite poles, the exclusively intellectual and the exclusively affective or

emotional. At these extremes we have, on the one hand, a pure logic of ideas, a reasoning practically without feeling, on the other hand, a continuity or logic of pure feeling (an emotioning or passioning, if we may use terms recently introduced by the poets) without ideas or with ideas of so little significance for the continuity as to be negligible. Between these extremes we find a series of phases which shade into each other. Beginning with the logic of ideas, we find first a type which is described as 'mixed reasoning,' that of the orator or pleader, which, while superficially a logic of ideas, assuming its forms, is in reality determined in its continuity by the emotional or value coefficients of the concepts employed. Its procedure consists in the accumulation and gradation of the concepts used, in such a way as to produce an emotional effect of conviction. Still more emotional in type are those continuities of thought wholly controlled by the emotional coefficient of the concepts employed — (a) the passional reasoning of love, hate, etc., (b) the relatively unconscious reasoning involved in transformations of sentiments, as in conversion, (c) imaginative reasoning, as in divination and magic, and justificative reasoning as seen in the emotional process by which the believer, for instance, seeks to justify himself or providence, or in processes by which we seek to console ourselves. These are the forms of the emotional logic in the narrow sense. In them the mean term of transition from concept to concept is predominantly the emotional coefficient.

If, on the other hand, we start from the other extreme, the logic of pure feeling, we may pass by gradual stages to the last type of emotional continuity we have been considering. The phenomena in which the purely emotional unity and continuity are found are the æsthetic states of appreciation and creation of music. The 'content' of this type of consciousness is conceived to be pure feeling, emotional abstracts, feelings abstracted from ideas and combined in a purely emotional unity. While recognizing the existence of types of mind in which ideas do play a rôle in the hearing of music, Ribot finds that rôle to be insignificant and the cases are so few as to be negligible. Next in order appears the poetry of the symbolists where the material is indeed words, the symbols of thought, but by means of unusual combinations of these words, unusual emphasis upon their sound suggestions, revival of obsolete forms, their function as vehicles of thought is minimized and their unity and continuity lies largely in their emotional connotation. Finally we have the love trance of the mystics with its emotional exaltation. This may be viewed as a transition stage between the æsthetic phenomena we have been considering and the emotional logic

of the passional, unconscious and other types. With the æsthetic states it shares the unity which comes from (a) the magisterial rôle which the emotional abstract, *émotion fixe* plays, and (b) the poverty of ideas (a characteristic of the love trance which Ribot has properly emphasized), while with the passional reasoning it shares the reality which comes from the dominance of a real passion and which is absent in the æsthetic states. The series of transition stages between the pure logic of ideas and the purely emotional continuity is thus completed.

Into the details of the analysis which underlies the classification here presented we cannot enter. Nevertheless certain fundamental questions inevitably arise. We shall confine ourselves to two. In the first place, are these types of continuity, referable according to the author neither to association nor to ideational activity but rather to emotional mean terms, clearly made out? In the second place, are such types of emotional unity and continuity properly described as a logic of the sentiments?

As to the first of these questions, there seems to the present writer no manner of doubt. While as to the details of the classification of the intermediate stages there will doubtless be room for change — indeed it is a question whether the classification into the passional, unconscious, justificative, etc., is not merely superficially descriptive and not functional, whether uniformities in change of functional presuppositions would not afford a more scientific basis — nevertheless the important point is certainly established — that there exist continuities of meaning in which the thread of meaning is largely if not wholly emotional. The case which in an earlier work the author made out for the purely affective imagination which he called the *diffluent* (in music and symbolist poetry) the present writer then considered convincing and a more or less continuous study of the problem in the meantime has not led him to change his mind. The other thesis of the book, that there are types of continuity of ideas, of concepts where the continuity lies in the emotional coefficient, the value suggestion of the ideal content, seems equally well established.

The answer to the second question can scarcely be so unqualified an affirmation. To be sure the question whether we shall call such types of unity and continuity a logic of the sentiments is partly merely a question of definition — and yet precisely for that reason it is important. The definition of reason upon which the terminology is based is that of Boole which describes it as 'an elimination of a mean term in a system which has three terms,' and the question as to whether

we have an emotional or an intellectual reasoning reduces itself to the question whether the mean term is the emotional coefficient of the concept, its value, or the ideational coefficient, its meaning. Nevertheless, for the very reason that historically the words logic and reasoning have been applied exclusively to those processes where the mean term was taken wholly in its ideational connotation, it is a question whether the case for a purely emotional unity and continuity is not prejudiced by the use of these terms. Ribot himself raises the question why the rôle of the affective abstract as the principle of æsthetic and quasi æsthetic unity and continuity remains to such a degree unrecognized and finds several plausible reasons therefor (the undeveloped state of the psychology of feeling and, that which goes with it, the predominantly objective and intellectual cast of the concrete imaginative products of the past). All this is doubtless true, but it is possible that an equally serious difficulty in the way of the recognition of the essential fact lies in the terms with which those who believe in its existence have chosen to describe it. Moreover, as Gardiner has suggested, the very broad definition of reasoning which constitutes the premise, 'the elimination of the mean term' makes it possible to apply the term to all kinds of process including, for instance, even the development of a plant.

In view of these considerations and in view of the further fact that this whole question concerns what may perhaps without too much presumption or jocularity be described as the N-rays of psychology (since those who have seen — or rather felt — the revived feeling and emotional abstract are still so few in number!), I venture to suggest the need of a more colorless term to include both types of continuity, the predominantly intellectual and the predominantly emotional — let us say for instance Mental Movement, under which might then be subsumed the two types of movement, the intellectual or *reasoning* and the Value Movement, a term already made technical in the works of the worth psychologists, or (if we do not balk at a new term) *emotioning*, to correspond to reasoning. With some such modifications of terminology certain misunderstandings might be avoided.

But whatever may be said of the difficulties of the terminology employed, it nevertheless remains true that Ribot has thrown light upon an important though obscure region of mental life, the significance of which lies in the contribution it makes to that new chapter of a larger epistemology which a developed psychology of values will constitute. This larger significance Ribot recognizes in his only par-

tially successful attempt to correlate the products of his own method with the results of this psychology, and, perhaps, still more in his emphatic insistence that this logic of the sentiments is not merely a chapter on fallacies.

WILBUR M. URBAN.

TRINITY COLLEGE.

Wundtian Feeling Analysis and the Genetic Significance of Feeling. MARGARET WASHBURN. *Philos. Rev.*, 1905, XIV., 21-29.

The author sharply criticises Wundt's method of feeling analysis as set forth in the fifth edition of the *Grundzüge*, and maintains that there is an irreconcilable contradiction in point of view between the doctrine of the unitary character of feeling and its analysis into a qualitative manifold arrayed in ordered classes.

In opposition to Wundt the author holds that 'sensation and feeling are not separated by an impassable gulf, and that transitional forms between the two are conceivable.' These transitional forms belong fundamentally to the sensation type because they lie within the zone of possible introspective analysis. Wundt's 'strain-relaxation' and 'excitement-tranquilization' processes are placed here, while the 'pleasantness-unpleasantness' series are regarded as the only ones that meet the test of absolute subjectivity, which entitles them to be classed as pure feelings.

This region of transitional experience lying between the purely objective on the one hand and the purely subjective on the other, has its physical stimuli within the body, and the comparatively undeveloped power of analyzing such experiences is explained on the basis of the needs of living beings. In the course of phylogenetic growth this power has reached a high degree of development with reference to stimuli originating outside of the body, but with reference to stimuli located within the body such qualitative analysis has become necessary only when these processes have departed from the normal and taken the form of pain.

Those bodily processes, on the other hand, which are incapable of giving rise to the experience of pain are regarded as the stimuli for the experience of pleasantness and unpleasantness, and are supposed to be largely concerned with the vaso-motor system.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

F. H. HAMILTON.

The Problem of the Emotions. GUSTAV SPILLER. *Amer. J. of Psychol.*, 1904, XV., 569-580.

The author finds himself dissatisfied with either the Lange-James theory, or the theory of Professor Irons that an emotion is irreducible.

After introspection, he is inclined to assert that an emotion arises when "a more or less urgent need, aroused directly by some definite object or idea, is eagerly and vainly seeking to be satisfied. In so far as there is, as a consequence, mental excitement, a more or less turbulent endeavor to meet the situation in a satisfactory manner, so far the state becomes emotional. * * *" 'Physical excitement is present in emotions as an essential constituent,' but 'it is not a question of bodily excitement giving rise to mental excitement or mental excitement giving rise to bodily excitement, since they are both substantial parts of one act.' As to a classification of the emotions, the author feels that the classification cannot be an independent one, but must depend on the ultimate classification of the other facts of mental life, for 'perhaps we shall find * * * that there are strictly speaking no emotions, and that what we call emotions are directly aroused attitudes in a state of excitement.'

A part of the article is devoted to a discussion of the changes in the emotional life due to human development. Many emotions are too violent and are eliminated in the advanced social stages; only those persist which are adapted to the larger and more organized life.

BELOIT COLLEGE.

R. H. STETSON.

De la nature du sentiment amoureux. S. JANKÉLÉVITCH. Rev. Phil., LVIII., 353-378.

The author's problem is to account for the mental element in the tender passion, apart from the satisfaction of a particular need or the instinct to continue the species. This he finds in the tendency toward the absolute or infinite. The propagation of a species is a constant illustration of the tendency from unity to infinity. The single cell in the lower animals divides and the process of division continues to infinity both in number and in time. There is a consciousness of similar communing with the infinite in the ecstasies of passion that come to a few rare geniuses. This is compared with the communings of the mystics with the deity. The closeness of the relation between the two processes is also shown by the platonic affections of Michael Angelo, Dante and Petrarch, which served as continual spurs to works of genius. The whole argument seems to turn on an undistributed middle in the word infinite. Even if we overlook the initial fallacy, there is no particular reason why a consciousness of the absolute should occupy an individual at one stage of the process rather than another. But the argument is poetry, not science, and scientific criticism is unavailing.

W. B. PILLSBURY.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

ÆSTHETICS.

Psychology of Æsthetics. I. Experimental Prospecting in the Field of the Comic. LILLIAN J. MARTIN. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1905, XVI., 35-118.

In the series of experiments here reported Miss Martin had for her purpose to become acquainted with some of the problems involved in 'the comic' and to ascertain the possibility of applying to them certain well-known psychological methods.

The methods employed are summed under three heads: (a) undirected introspection, (b) psychophysical methods and (c) directed introspection by means of a questionnaire.

The experiments under the first head consisted in presenting comic pictures to the subject serially, in pairs and singly for a period of 5 minutes. The results indicate that the judgment is affected by physical and mental conditions, that by the serial method successive pictures lose in funniness and that one picture palls with time.

Under the second head six methods freely adapted from the psychophysical methods were employed.

I. By method of impression with serial judgments it was ascertained that (1) fun decreases with successive exposures at a given sitting and with a given exposure at successive sittings; that (2) the interspersing of new pictures has varying effects on the judgment of different individuals; that (3) forced or spontaneous laughter enhances the comic; that (4) a coffee stimulant helps, while (5) sickness or low spirits decrease the comic effect as does also (6) a rigid holding of the body; that (7) putting aside the pictures for reëxamination after several months tends to restore their effectiveness.

II. The method of constant differences to investigate time and space differences showed the time effect to be very slight, whether a picture as compared with another preceded or followed it. With respect to space differences, positions to the right seemed more effective, apparently due to a natural tendency to look to the right rather than to the left.

III. By the method of averages pictures of sad and comic intent were made to precede the comic pictures being judged. The sad pictures in most cases caused a decrease in funniness of the succeeding pictures, while preceding funny pictures were effective in the opposite way, though not to such a degree. The effect of sad and gay music accompanying the presentation of comic pictures was then tested. It was found that gay music may enhance the comic, but sad

music is less effective, just contrary to the preceding experiment. The contrasts here made use of were on the whole ineffective for increasing the comic effect, which shows that a careful arrangement is necessary to make contrast a cause of fun.

IV. By the method of choice we find that fun increases as the smile on a face broadens or as a down-cast face becomes more doleful, the former of the two being relatively more effective. Large pictures are more effective than small and the introduction of movement in the picture enhances the comic materially.

V. The method of gradual variation points a way to investigating the effects of exaggeration. However, the results at hand are not very clear and show great individual differences as to the comic effect of objects which are shortened or lengthened from their normal proportions.

VI. By the method of expression certain pneumographic and sphygmographic curves were taken but they revealed no very significant characteristics.

The questionnaire brought forth considerable introspective evidence as to the nature of the comic, unfortunately it is not very adequately worked over. The importance of details and 'fun centers' in a comic picture is noted; also the attitude of the observer. An imitative laugh even before the point of the joke is comprehended helps the total effect considerably. Imitation, muscular movements and organic sensations seem to play a large part in determining the comic. The number, intensity and character of the imitative tendencies are all important factors. Association is very important and may make a comic situation out of one not essentially so. The proper subordination of non-comic factors may give rise to an alternation of feelings on the whole pleasurable and adding to the total comic effect. Any attempt to inhibit laughter or other muscular demonstration weakens the effect of the comic. Novelty, suddenness and contrast or incongruity seem the most important factors in determining the comic when they are brought in contact with a peculiar mental receptiveness.

It can scarce be said that this work has materially enlarged our knowledge of 'the comic,' though it has 'prospected' to some purpose in showing up the relative merits of the various methods employed. The lack of any definite theoretical basis or conclusion must be felt by most readers. In the opinion of the reviewer this work may be said to typify a certain kind of experimentation which gives no thought as to cost of time and labor but is content to 'prospect' with unbiased mind in hope of discovery. Valuable discoveries have thus been made

and doubtless will again, but in view of the ever-increasing 'material' which such work is dumping almost daily upon us, it appears that time is come when one should husband one's strength to better purpose and work more directly to the end of laying down certain theoretical principles which shall be both enlightening and useful to coördinate the matter which our experiments bring forth.

We have to thank Miss Martin for having verified many of our natural conjectures concerning certain factors which go to make up 'the comic.' We regret only that she did not see fit to append for our benefit such a theory of the comic as her intimate personal knowledge would undoubtedly have enabled her to do.

ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

The Relation of Æsthetics to Psychology and Philosophy. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. *Philos. Rev.*, 1905, XIV., 1-20.

To the nineteenth century must be given the credit for having stated the problem with which the æsthetician of the present century is chiefly concerned. The task of throwing light upon the most fundamental of æsthetic questions is left to psychology. It must find some explanation for that phase of consciousness in man that we call his 'sense of beauty.' This achieved, our psychological foundation firmly established, it remains to the philosopher to find a place in his system for beauty as a part of our experience. Psychology has already made a number of contributions to our knowledge of the æsthetic consciousness. Not the least important of these is the distinction it has pointed out between the attitude of the artist as the creator of beauty and that of the appreciator or beholder. That the latter attitude is the broader is evident since the sense of beauty is aroused in us not merely by objects related to the fine arts but by natural objects as well. Experimental psychology has done much toward clarifying our ideas with regard to certain relations inherent within the beautiful object itself. Especially valuable have been its investigations with respect to the 'golden section,' symmetry, order, rhythm, tonal relation and melodic succession. The active part played by the mind itself in the experience of beauty has been subjected to analysis. Fechner's principle, 'the unity of manifoldness' and the principles advanced by Lipps of sympathetic introjection, 'Einfühlung' and of 'monarchic subordination,' though they cannot be regarded as ultimate solutions of the problem, are nevertheless important additions to æsthetic theory. A truer principle than these, according to the author, is to

be found in 'relatively permanent pleasure in revival' as a quality which differentiates the sense of beauty from all other mental states, in all classes of people and under all conditions. Relative permanency is a characteristic peculiar to the type of pleasure known as æsthetic, and is due to the play of attention about a variety of pleasurable elements. In the art instinct we find the source for all æsthetic activity. Training, knowledge of technique are but tools, the best work of the artist is the spontaneous expression of his impulsive nature. The study of æsthetic problems by the philosopher from the genetic point of view has brought to light many significant facts with regard to the relation between the art effort and other human activities. Its function is seen to be that of social consolidation. Its dependence upon economic conditions is clearly shown. This genetic study moreover reveals the fact that the evolution of the art instinct has been accompanied by a gradual differentiation of the various art types. From the earliest time of which we have any record the arts of hearing and the arts of sight have been distinct. But in many animals we find rudimentary art instincts in which rhythmical movement, an art of sight and tonal accompaniment, are invariably combined. So, too, they are found closely related in the song and dance of the savage. As the process of development has gone on we find differentiated within the arts of sight, the graphic arts, painting, sculpture, and architecture, within the arts of hearing, rhetoric, poetry, literature and music. Each of these arts as the inevitable form of expression for a special content yields a special kind of æsthetic delight. Each will develop freely in the degree to which it maintains its independence of the others. The relation of the Real of Beauty to the Real of Truth and the Real of Goodness is still an open question. The error of the æsthetic realist lies in using the term 'True' in too narrow a sense. Beauty, Truth and Goodness are all parts of the Real. But Beauty may be said to be the Real as discovered in the world of impression, Goodness the Real discovered in the world of expression, and Truth the Real in the realm exclusive of impression and expression. Only in so far as truth and goodness involve relatively permanent pleasure of impression are they possible elements of beauty.

Über die Methode der Kunstphilosophie. KONRAD LÄNGE. *Zeitschrift für Psychologie u. Physiologie der Sinnesorg.*, XXXVI., 5.

The problem of modern æsthetics is the problem of method. The outcome of investigations into the nature of art and the æsthetic attitude is largely determined by the way in which the investigation is

carried on. Most important among the many methods advocated by different æstheticians at the present time are the deductive, the genetic, the empirical or method of logical abstraction, and the method of psychological experiment.

Of the first of these methods, the deductive, Tolstoi, Laurila and Volkert are the most ardent exponents. The answer to the question, 'What is art?' is to be found, they tell us, in an 'inner ideal' which slumbers in all men and which the introspection of the critic brings to light. Art is the expression of feeling, the '*Gefühlsansteckung*,' the means by which the artist arouses in other men his religious emotions. Art concerns itself with higher realities than beauty and sensuous delight. Its aim is ethical. The value of any art product may be measured by the significance of the moral feeling it expresses. Any activity is æsthetic in the degree to which it conforms to this inner standard. Obviously the deductive method stands condemned by its results. We can place little confidence in a method that would force us to rule out architecture and decoration from the list of the arts, and that would exclude many of the greatest artists of all time.

A more adequate way of determining the nature of art is by the method of logical abstraction. One's conception of art is formed in much the same way as one's general idea — 'horse' for instance — from the outer characteristics common to all the arts that have come into one's experience. At the outset we must understand clearly that the nature of art and not the nature of beauty is the subject of our inquiry. Then we must determine from its usage in speech what the word 'art' means — not to the ignorant nor to the philosopher, but to the ordinarily well-educated, appreciative, plain man of society. Painting, sculpture, poetry, music, drama, dancing, architecture and decoration may be accepted unhesitatingly as the arts of modern times. The essential characteristic common to all of these is found to be not '*Gefühlsansteckung*,' but the power of creating the illusion of nature by means of color, form and movement. This likeness to nature, it is true, oftentimes arouses emotion, but to enkindle feeling or teach a lesson is never the direct purpose of the æsthetic activity.

This common characteristic 'illusion' once discovered by a process of pure logical abstraction, it should be subjected to a systematic psychological analysis. Introspection reveals the fact that illusion is a form of conscious self-deceit, the contemporaneous experience of two ideas, the work of art and nature, the content of the work and the personality of the artist. The aim of art is not the narrow ethical aim advocated by Tolstoi, but that of maintaining and exercising by means of illusion all the faculties man needs in the battle of life.

In order that our criterion 'illusion' may gain universal validity, may become an æsthetic norm, introspection must be supplemented by observation of others. Such observation is peculiarly the work of the experimental psychology. But this method may be used with advantage only in the study of the simplest psychical phenomena — memory, sensation, fatigue and other measurable phenomena. It is limited in its scope to a small number of persons and the conclusions of these are often affected by conventional ideas or theoretical knowledge. Its field is limited to the purely formal side of æsthetics, to the problems of rhythm, color arrangement and proportion.

In the place of this method Lange would substitute what he calls the method of art history. We must question the masters of the golden age of art and the thousands they have influenced. Their answer confirms our introspection. "Truly art dwells in nature; he who can tear her hence possesses her." The art product represents nature and an artistic personality. Finally, through the genetic method of inquiry into the evolution of art, from the study of the beginnings of art in primitive man and the animals, it is found that the higher the stage of development the freer the art from moral and other non-æsthetic considerations and the larger the place held by pure illusion.

GRACE BRUCE.

VASSAR COLLEGE.

Formprinzip des Schönen. TH. MEYER. Arch. f. Syst. Philos., 1904, X., 338-394.

Mr. Meyer gets a starting-point in the discovery that art demands of its product a unity which life — the content of art — does not possess. Hence the existence of a formal principle in art. Sensuous activity accompanies the perception of an object, and the pleasure afforded by this activity he finds to be quite different from pleasure in the content as such. The principle of the *form-impulse* (Formtrieb) is to be sought in this perceptive activity. The pleasure felt is the more keen, the more energetic and at the same time unconscious of painful effort the activity is. *Æsthetic pleasure on its formal side means, therefore, the natural and harmonious functioning of the perceptive organs forced on us by the structural aspect of an object.*

There are three sources of formal æsthetic pleasure experience of (1) seeing, (2) hearing and (3) the activity of what the writer calls our power of representation through speech. These do not exist in isolation, but represent distinct sense-stresses. Rooted in these special capacities is the one universal category of the beautiful in respect of form: *The Ideal Form of the Beautiful.*

The first office of this category is to fix *unity amid variety*. This is brought about through the proper graduating of differences so that they imperceptibly shade into one another. By such graduating we escape weariness, and by such variety we escape ennui. The writer states that this is the complete conditioning of the one through the other. He distinguishes life and art. Life has variety, art alone has unity. In art the parts maintain distinction through contrast, tension and dissonance; these in discreet measure.

Out of 'unity in variety' arises the demand for *clear and comprehensive structure*. Art is said to consist of such choice from what is called 'Wirklichkeit' (actual life) as allows for design within comprehensible limits.

'*Adequacy of expression*' is the weightiest of all determinations of the ideal form of the beautiful. In the demand for adequate expression, form and content become inseparable, two points of view in the same thing. Adequacy of expression does not exclude a certain measure of ugliness, both formal and material. Ugliness too is a source of formal pleasure if, without painful effort, art is able to mould it into harmony with the total.

Mr. Meyer concludes that in art that is most beautiful which gets the desired effect with the least cost. This he calls the principle of least 'Kraftmass.'

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RELIGION.

The Differentiation of the Religious Consciousness. IRVING KING.
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW Monograph Series, No. 27, pp. ii + 72.

The purpose of this monograph is to offer a preliminary study in the science of religion from a genetic psychological point of view. Psychologically the religious attitude is to be regarded as a specialized form of reaction. Its development is to be investigated as any other reaction of the psycho-physical organism. On this basis it is held that as complete a description of religious phenomena should be possible as is possible of any other observable facts.

The study is mainly occupied with the genesis of the religious attitude in the race. The conception is advanced that it, along with other complex forms of experience, has developed from a primitive unspecialized type of experience. The experience of primitive man is undifferentiated in the sense that its problems and processes are relatively simple, being those growing most directly out of the necessi-

ties of food and reproduction. There may be a question as to whether the modern savage can be properly used in any reconstructions of the life of truly primitive man. To a certain extent this is held to be possible because the modern savage represents a plane of arrest and his elaborate life is the product of a series of differentiations upon a dead level. His customs, in the main, have not been developed with reference to the more adequate mediation of problems, but are rather mere dead accumulations through association by contiguity. If this is true, it would seem that in the savage life of to-day there might be discovered many truly primitive elements of experience. In this way, it is suggested, the first steps in the evolution of the religious consciousness may be traced. That is, among the natural races of the present day there are possibly examples of religious practices which approximate all stages in the differentiation of the religious consciousness.

Religious practices are held to be those that arise under certain conditions when practical activities become complicated by the increased difficulty of attaining their customary goals. The intermediate practices which arise acquire certain values which are greatly enhanced if they are taken up into the social consciousness. The consciousness of value thus arises and is developed within the social body. Those values which are felt by the group as a whole as most intimately connected with its permanence and well-being are religious values. Mediating activities which are mainly in the hands of individuals and with which the consciousness of the group is imperfectly identified may be regarded as only embryonically religious. Customs of Australians and North American Indians are cited which seem to represent varying grades in the definite demarcation of the religious consciousness from mere practical attitudes.

Religious values develop from all aspects of primitive life, as against Herbert Spencer with his ghost theory of the origin of religion. The primitive religious consciousness was probably a diffuse one, in which all acts were regarded with circumspection and hence had an element of religious value. Religion is essentially an attitude toward life as a whole rather than an intellectual theory regarding one of its problems.

Since religious values develop in connection with mediating activities, it is evident that the relation between religion and habit and custom must be very close. The religious attitude is, in fact, secondary, and custom is primary. Illustrations are given pointing to the origin of various rudimentary religious sentiments in the customs of primitive races, *e. g.*, notions of sacred places and objects, regard for ancestors, duty, self-restraint, reverence, sacred ceremonies, etc.

The importance of the social atmosphere in the evolution of the religious type of consciousness becomes clearer when religion is compared with magic. It is held that magic has developed chiefly in the context of the occasional and individual, while religion has come from the more habitual and social.

Since the religious attitude is a specialization out of the life processes, it should have a certain functional relation to these processes. The possibility of such a functional connection is discussed and the question is raised as to whether the religious consciousness is necessarily a universal possession of the human mind. The constitution of modern society certainly is less favorable to the production of the attitude in all alike than was that of ancient society. There is, in other words, more opportunity to-day for individual differences to appear. If one's situation is not particularly favorable for the development of this type of consciousness, he is less than ever likely to acquire it by social suggestion. True non-religious people are much more likely to be found among the culture races than among the natural races where they have usually been sought.

The content of the religious consciousness represents a process of selection, the determining causes of which need to be investigated. The preponderance of elements allied to the habitual, emotional, instinctive, and, in general, the subconscious phases of mental life, is generally recognized by students of religious phenomena. It is suggested that these types of consciousness have acquired a peculiar religious significance because of a certain assumption common to all religions, namely, that there is a possibility of the present physical and mental series of events being susceptible of interpolation by extra-physical and supra-mental elements. This assumption strikes at the roots of the authority of the rational phases of consciousness. The latter become no longer the only, or even the most important means for the attainment of truth. The validity of the logical side of consciousness is impugned by the assumption of the possibility of divine illumination and control. The supposed illuminations from supernatural sources can only be manifestations of the more automatic aspects of consciousness. Those mental states removed from the center of critical examination thus acquire religious value because they are a residuum, concerning which the assertions of the religionist are difficult to disprove.

THE AUTHOR.

Ascétisme et Mysticisme. B. DE MONTMORAND. *Revue Philosophique*, 1904, LVIII., 232-262.

Asceticism, looked at subjectively, is, says the writer, a process of purification, looked at objectively it is a process of psychological simplification. That is, from the point of view of the ascetic it is a process by which he shuts out the evils admitted through sense and comes into communion with God. To the outside observer it is a process for simplifying consciousness by cutting it off from all external impressions.

The method of procedure is very much the same among all ascetics. There is first a period of emptying or mortification, then that of refilling or exaltation. During the first period man can, by his own activity, assist in bringing about the desired end. The body is subjected to rigorous and often painful treatment, while the soul is, at the same time, reduced to a state of humility and obedience. Though the ascetic considers the second state one of passivity, he does not disregard the influence of bodily attitude on the emotional state. He, therefore, often goes through a series of exercises such as kneeling, prostrating himself, etc.

The two mental activities during this period are self examination and meditation. The latter is all important and is at the basis of the spiritual life of all orthodox mystics. This meditation differs from that of philosophy in that it is not speculative, but has as its end the arousing of the affections.

The mystic gradually shuts out all idea of sensible objects until an absolute unity of consciousness is established and the social sentiment effaced. But the ecstatic periods are of short duration and are separated by long intervals during which the mystic appears as an eminently social being. He seeks a unity in which all humanity shall be joined, according to the words of Christ, 'That they may be one as we are.' The love of God necessarily implies love of one's neighbor. It is interesting here to note that Professor Leuba in an article in the *Revue Philosophique* for July, 1902, has considered that in the great Christian Mystics is found the fullest development of the tendency toward the 'universalization of action,' a tendency which is at the basis of all social life.

The mystics have been misunderstood because only one phase of their existence has been considered. The alternation of active states with those of inaction is simply an illustration of the rhythmic tendency found in all life. Every man of action must have his periods of meditation. Contemplation does not exclude but prepares for action

and determines it. This statement, in just so far as it is true, contains a serious argument in favor of the contemplative life, and, since mysticism is a function of asceticism, is the best apology for ascetic mysticism.

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

La Philosophie en Amérique depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours (1607-1900). Essai historique. L. VAN BECELAERE, O. P. Introduction by JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, Eclectic Publishing Company, 1904. Pp. xvii + 180.

Out of the articles appearing in the *Revue Thomiste* in 1902-03 there grew this historical monograph on a subject which has hitherto been treated in brief resumes only. In an effort to be historical rather than critical, the author gives an excellent, though somewhat incomplete, exposition of the philosophical work that has been done 'in America' in the eight chapters which the book comprises. Chapter I. treats of 'The American Spirit and Speculative Thought'; II., 'The Colonial Period (1607-1765)'; III., 'Scotch Influence'; IV., 'Influence of German Philosophy (transcendentalism in New England)'; V., 'Contemporary Schools — Idealists'; VI., 'The Philosophy of Evolution'; VII., 'Psychology'; VIII., 'The Present Time.' The epilogue looks forward to what philosophy may become amongst us, and in an appendix mention is made of the attitude and achievements characteristic of the thought which is maintained by the thinkers in the Roman Catholic church.

Since Porter's brief but scholarly review of 'Philosophy in America' which appeared thirty years ago, as a part of his contribution to Morris's translation of Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, there has not been a more extensive attempt to bring together in proper balance and with adequate historical perspective the facts which go to characterize what some of us are more and more adventurously calling 'American' philosophy. Perhaps the most interesting feature of this book is the fact that it was written by one whose theological training and views are those least allied to philosophy during its entire modern development, and consequently showing least influence in the determinative agencies at work in shaping American thinking. The author's scholarship and the warmth of his appreciation of philosophical developments are so unusual that any student of the subject can be both instructed and entertained by this account.

And to those jingoists who insist that there is such a thing as 'the American mind' there can now be administered the proper tonic which is afforded by this opportunity to see ourselves as others see us.

In explaining the relative absence of speculative thought in America, the author looks to the susceptibility to outside influences and the ready adaptation of realism to practical life as the tendencies which have prevailed in 'the great machine shop' which American activity has been so far. In the hurly-burly of three practical centuries, the philosophical voice could not be heard. While properly assuring us that there is no such thing as 'an American philosophy,' the author daringly looks to the undated future when America will be the modern Greece. He contends that America is like ancient Greece; and, in prophesying our future intellectual developments, he derives comfort for his arguments from the similarity of geographical position, climate, wealth, practical ability and mental qualities between the two nationalities (pp. 12-13).

The antecedents of philosophy in America, which were chiefly religious in tone and individual in development during the first century, are said to be Calvinistic scholasticism and the philosophical spirit borrowed from the contemporary Lockean doctrine of ideas. These two elements were united in Jonathan Edwards, with whom was born in America not *philosophy*, nor *a philosophy*, but philosophical *speculation*. His influence was not to indoctrinate, but to make men *think*.

The range of Scotch influence is traced during two periods, first its reign (1800-1860), and second its decline (1860-1900). The treatment of men and writings is full, but goes a little too far, perhaps, when dealing with contemporaries of to-day in classing most ardent theists and intuitionist moralists as direct descendants of Scottish realism.

The influence of German philosophy is adequately told in the full and interesting account of the appearance and development of New England transcendentalism and of the events associated with Concord, our 'transcendental Mecca.' In the academic institutions during this period Scottish thought was chiefly dominate, and, of course, had the widest range of influence.

In dealing with current tendencies, it is noteworthy that the author finds idealism to be the undeniably dominant type of speculative thought, particularly in the domain of metaphysics, and probably in ethics (p. 105). When stating, however, that Lotze, Green and Hegel are the important authorities to American thinkers in this

movement, he hardly does historic justice to the present day significance of renewed interest in the neo-Kantian movement.

Realism and Saxonism (if one may mix logic and blood!), mingled in the American type of mind, lead it to an unusual interest in positive science and in the evolutionary generalization which has been derived from it. The treatment of the philosophy of evolution is grouped about its defenders and its adversaries, and is fairly complete. Just why anthropology, religious philosophy and social science as American subjects are grouped in the same chapter with evolution, is not made plain. This mode of treatment makes it necessary for the author to repeat his treatment of men, and shows the limitations produced by the tendency to cross the historical and the logical developments. Psychology is regarded as a science and not as a branch of philosophy. The historical review is interested chiefly in its experimental developments, from which the author is not inclined to anticipate any great intellectual reformations. He falls back upon Wundt in support of his position.

In reviewing the present tendencies, the account includes a description of the varied machinery that has been produced to maintain and to extend philosophical thinking and teaching among us, such as the periodical press, the higher institutions with their professorial chairs, text-book material, and the several associations recently organized. These agencies give the author an optimistic view of the future, particularly when he is noting the social and political fusion which is being wrought among us. Americanism thus means to him a unified people who have a soul, an inner unity, which needs a rational basis, and possesses a moral and intellectual sanity guaranteeing national existence and duration.

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EPISTEMOLOGY.

Scepticism. A. K. ROGERS. *Philosophical Review*, 1904, XIII., 627-641.

By scepticism the author means 'that somewhat unsystematic attitude whose ground is to be found primarily in an appeal to the fact of error, and a challenge to point out the marks by which we might recognize truth if we once were to stumble on it.' In the beginning the article sets forth the sceptic's attitude, his questions, and his complaints. "How can one," asks the sceptic, "be any more assured of the validity of to-day's conceptions than he was of yester-

day's? Now he clearly sees that those of yesterday were false. May not such be clearly seen to-morrow to hold true of to-day's conceptions? Again, good, sincere, intelligent men hold exactly opposite theories in regard to vital truths. Whence this difference? If truth can be assuredly known, why cannot some man so present his convictions that the presentation will be accompanied by a conviction of its validity?"

These are the questions and complaints of the sceptic. They do deserve some consideration. They are not senseless quibblings. But to grant them a respectful hearing is not to grant them the power of overthrowing the possibility of knowledge. Scepticism is absurd. There must be a new belief by whose standard a comparison is made, else the old one cannot be doubted. Men are naturally and necessarily believers. Scepticism has no right to say this thing may be believed, that must not. All the sceptic may say is that he cannot at present come to any conclusion about the matter. "Scepticism stands primarily as a disinclination to prosecute further the search for data." No man is a sceptic in every direction. Few are sceptics in their own special field. "The sceptic has no more right to universalize his own attitude than a child would have to demand that everybody should stop playing because he is tired."

"Grant the absurdity and injustice of my dogmatic attitude," says the sceptic; "grant there is truth. How am I to know what particular, concrete thing is true, and what is not? Must not every man admit that any particular belief of his may be wrong? Further, why does every man believe his own conviction to be correct, and the opposite, which his neighbor holds, wrong? Is it not, after all, a matter of feeling that my convictions are true and his false?"

These are sensible questions and deserve consideration. True, at last every man must depend upon his own private assurance. He must be the court of last resort. His belief satisfies him. Hence he is assured of its truth. Further it must be admitted that logical certainty belongs only to the abstract statement of the conditions of belief, and not to a single concrete belief about the nature of things.

These admissions do in no way, however, take away the possibility of deciding in case of conflict. Before one is justified in assuming the rôle of the decider, he must, before rejecting his opponent's views, put himself sympathetically in the place of the one who holds it, and understand why it seems to him true. He must feel that he sees and feels all the other man sees and feels, and sees and feels more. If it were impossible to see as another sees, the state of affairs

would be deplorable. Fortunately, however, men do often see alike and agree on certain things. This agreement greatly increases the probability of the certainty of the thing.

Then, after all, this conviction of certainty is feeling—a feeling of consistency—accompanied by a knowledge of a more or less extended acquaintance with the facts. So, at last, the sense of consistency is the only rational test. This practical assurance which consistency gives is the one thing scepticism cannot touch. It may point out the possibility of the error in any given judgment, but that is not enough. It must show that the given concrete judgment is false before it disturbs the feeling of assurance.

Ethical Subjectivism. THEODORE DE LAGUNA. *Philosophical Review*, 1904, XIII., 642–659.

No theory is more thoroughly distasteful to the scientific observer than ethical subjectivism, which holds that conduct invariably right which the agent believes to be right. Such a theory not only offends common good sense, but runs counter to the teachings of the greatest of ethical philosophers. Plato and Aristotle, while they would likely not identify morality with knowledge, would most certainly not deny that it includes knowledge.

And yet when one attempts to point out the exact place of knowledge in the moral ideal, the task is not easy. If it be claimed that the agent is responsible for the probable consequences of his action, then he will be held responsible not only for the exercise of his knowledge about the consequences of the action, but also for his lack of knowledge. Then if knowledge of the consequences of conduct has no assured place in the ideal, it becomes at least doubtful whether any knowledge is thus distinguished.

The evolution of the moral ideal has been a gradual inwardizing process. This does not, however, identify it with the old popular standard, 'let every man do what is right in his own eyes.' It does not issue in an anarchy of sentiment and practice. Anarchy springs from the opposite source, fatalism, which posits the determination of the morality of the act in some external uncontrolled event, making the agent good or bad despite himself.

Then what is meant by ethical subjectivism? It does not mean that the agent will always conceive the same act as right. It does not mean that he will not often in reflecting see the folly of former acts. It does not mean that he will not regret these acts. But it does mean that the act was nevertheless a good act, and any other act, though

justified by later reflection, would have been wrong. Nor does it mean that a man is to rest self-satisfied, content with his ignorance, trusting to the innocence of his intentions. For the increase of knowledge is one of the ends for which it is right to strive. Because unforeseen consequences and unweighed considerations are eliminated, it does not follow that foreseen consequences and effectual considerations are to be ignored. The value of subjectivism lies in the emphasis it places upon the judgment of the contemplated act.

This theory may be said to treat moral conduct atomistically—separating each man from every other, and making each appear to move in the light of his own conscience. This objection, however, is not serious. Every man is a part of a larger social whole. When he is determining in himself what is right, he is doing so with a judgment which is the result of numerous influences from society. It is from this very conception that the distinctive mark of the moral ideal arises. It is measured by the satisfaction of a self-conscious being as a harmonious totality. A careful distinction between moral and non-moral acts must be kept in mind. The far greater part of our acts are mere impulses, which have no moral phase. This does not mean that the agent has to deliberate on the probable consequences of the action. But it does mean that every moral act is a choice, and that the agent is aware of the choice as right or wrong.

It is often admitted that the formal distinction between right and wrong may be judged independently of the consequences, but its material rightness or wrongness must be determined by the outcome. For a well meant act may turn out ill, and the worst intentions may have a fortunate issue. Then it is asked the subjectivist, 'why do you claim that knowledge of the probable consequences has no part in the ideal?' What has been established as the criterion? The judgment. This judgment is an expression of character. This character is the result of the many experiences of the past. Then it has for its own constitution all the elements of a knowledge of probable consequences.

Another objection to this subjective criterion of moral action has been made. It is that there is need of an exterior criterion to put a stop to individual vagaries. This is a real problem, but not impossible of solution. Though the individual criterion is individual sentiment, yet it must be observed that in this respect, as in others, men are not altogether peculiar. In fact, their opinions of things are quite uniform. Further answer might be made to the effect that men live in social groups and thereby serve as a check on each other. By such the individual moral ideals are largely merged into a common ideal.

Then what has been found to be the relation between knowledge and virtue? Is goodness a mere willingness to be good? It is not; because the willingness to be good is so far from being a trait unconnected with knowledge of the right, that it is only by the manifestation of this trait that knowledge can be acquired. The relation between knowledge and disposition is, moreover, a reciprocal one. Not only is knowledge of the right to be developed by right conduct, but such knowledge is itself an element in the disposition which issues in right conduct.

"For ethical subjectivism, virtue is indeed knowledge, but not any knowledge. It is real knowledge, actual knowledge, knowledge as determining motives of conduct."

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Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions. B. RUSSELL
Mind, 1904, XIII. (Nos. 50-52).

The article is a critique upon the theory of knowledge as maintained in 'Ueber Gegenstände höherer Ordnung und deren Verhältniss zur innern Wahrnehmung,' *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane*, Vol. XXI., pp. 182-272 (1899), and *Ueber Annahmen*, Leipzig, pp. xv, 298 (1902).

The initial paragraph states Meinong's contention. "That every presentation and every belief must have an object other than itself, and, except in certain cases where mental existents happen to be concerned, extra-mental; that what is commonly called perception has as its object an existential proposition, into which enters as a constituent that whose existence is concerned, and not the idea of this existent; that truth and falsehood apply not to beliefs, but to their objects; and that the object of a thought, even when this object does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought: all these are theses which, though generally rejected, can nevertheless be supported by arguments which deserve at least a refutation. Except Frege, I know of no writer on the theory of knowledge who came as near to this position as Meinong."

The article is given in three divisions. The first objects to identifying the theory of knowledge with logic. Knowledge is psychical and logic has to do with the nature of propositions distinct from questions of knowledge. Meinong's 'objects of higher order,' called *complexes*, are perceptible. Judgment has two elements, (1) conviction and (2) affirmation or denial. Judgments and assumptions have reference to objectives or propositions. These differ not in respect to the objec-

tive, but to the conviction which is present in one and not in the other. These 'objects of higher order' are *superiora* to the presupposed objects or *inferiora*. They are the complexes formed of terms united by a relation. They are built upon objects as indispensable presuppositions. Objections: (1) Logical priority is obscure. (2) It is impossible among true propositions to distinguish those which are necessary from others which are mere fact. (3) Relations, though not complexes, are capable of being thought of apart from terms.

Under internal perception and the perception of time the writer gives no validity to the contention that presentations must be perceptible, because we know of such as have non-existent objects, and the non-existent cannot be perceived. He holds that the Being of the non-existent is often immediately known. Meinong's doctrine of the logical priority of the propositions, *inferiora*, to the cognitive relation or *superius*, places the theory of knowledge subsequent to both logic and psychology.

The second division is a review and a running comment upon Meinong's book, *Ueber Annahmen*. The chapter contents consecutively discussed are first principles, the characteristic functions of the sentence, the most obvious cases of assumptions, inferences with assumptions, the objectivity of the psychical, the apprehension of objects of higher order, the objective, the psychology of desire and value, and elements of the psychology of assumption. While the writer makes some few exceptions to Meinong's positions, he concedes the validity of the main arguments.

It will be seen that these chapters deal with the inter-relations of logic, psychology and epistemology. Meinong distinguishes 'objects of thought' from 'objects of presentation,' the former being non-representable. When objectives occur as objects it is usually the assumptions, not the judgments of them that occur, Meinong confesses that it is only since he recognized objectives that he has known *why* epistemology is not psychology; but he holds that both logic and epistemology must concern themselves with knowing as well as with knowledge.

The third division deals with the old question proposed by Pilate — 'What is truth?' Meinong holds that the object of a presentation is sometimes immanent, but at other times not so; while the object of a judgment, an objective, is always immanent. The writer maintains that an immanent object does not differ from no object. He then discusses the five theories of knowledge:

1. That knowledge does not differ from what is known — that is

to say, there is no *object* of knowledge. This is incompatible with direct inspection and it leads to logical difficulties as to identity.

2. Admitting the distinction of content and object, it may be held that the latter is merely immanent. But when we consider redness it is evident that the presentation and the object are distinct, and if there be an immanent object at all, there is also one which is not immanent. In the problem of the relation of the immanent to the transcendent, identity is the only possible relation. Truth is not merely the correspondence of ideas with reality. There is a difficulty in the supposition of non-correspondence, as an idea can only fail to correspond with an object by being the idea of something else. Erroneous judgments do not have transcendent objects at all. In those which are correct the transcendence is undeniable.

3. That the object is immanent when false, transcendent when true. This is untenable, as it is necessary to suppose that correct judgments also have immanent objects, and it is hard to suppose that nothing is objectively false.

4. That when a judgment is false, there is no object; when true, there is a transcendent object. All objections which obtain against transcendent objects in the case of erroneous judgments, when the immanent object is discarded, obtain in favor of the view that in such cases there is no object at all.

5. That the object is always transcendent. The writer maintains that even erroneous judgments have a transcendent object, in most cases indistinguishable from a complex.

In concluding the article the writer declares that there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood; some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white; belief is a certain attitude toward propositions, which is called knowledge when true and error when false; a fact appears to be merely a true proposition. It is good to believe true propositions and bad to believe false ones. This is the ultimate ethical proposition.

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DISCUSSION AND INVESTIGATION.

AN INQUIRY IN REGARD TO MENTAL PHENOMENA CONNECTED WITH ANÆSTHESIA.

While in the deeper stages of anæsthesia mental processes are usually so entirely submerged as to fall beyond the possibility of record, in the lighter stages and in the period of approach to, and most

favorably of all, in the period of recovery from more complete anæsthesia, the power of response to outward stimuli is sufficient to afford ample opportunity for a series of observations which furnish the motive to the present inquiry. The coöperation of surgeons and anæsthetizers is invited to secure data that bear upon any of the questions summarized below, or upon the general problem thus suggested. Special attention is directed to the importance of tracing relations between the phenomena recorded during anæsthesia and the normal, waking, mental traits of the subject. Indeed, the former can in many cases be interpreted only in the light of the latter; and observations become of value in proportion as the subject is able to account for the mental experiences of the unusual state by references to the normal source and trend of his mental processes. To determine these, skillful questioning controlled, where possible, by ingenious tests, will be the most effective instrument of inquiry.

1. *Analogies between the Lighter States of Anæsthesia and Hypnosis.* — Of these the chief trait is *increased suggestibility*: will the patient carry out automatically with enfeebled consciousness suggestions given by the operator to do thus and so, to feel or neglect certain sensations, to follow a train of thought, to carry out a code of signals between subject and operator? Is obedience to such suggestions apparent by facial expressions, involuntary cries, nods, etc., after more controlled forms of reaction have disappeared? Is there evidence that patients respond to similar suggestions not directly addressed to them? Do they react to the conversation of the attendants, to a vague knowledge of their surroundings, to interpretations, correct or incorrect, of what is actually going on? Are there any of these responses that reflect the normal habits, idiosyncrasies, etc., of the waking condition? Do they belong to the experiences immediately preceding or to a more remote past?

Next in importance are the *automatic activities*. Illustrations are desired of automatic talking, mechanical acts, and simple tricks of manner, of the type so common in sleeping persons who walk and talk in their sleep, answer questions without awakening, make movements as of knitting, counting money, etc., or other betrayal of their subconscious thought. In very favorable instances, it may be possible to place a pencil in the patient's hand and secure by questioning a subconscious answer or scribble or drawing that throws interesting light upon what is going on in the mind, even when there is but partial consciousness of surroundings or direction of mental processes. Such observations have especial value and should be accompanied by the actual records.

2. *Analogies between the Lighter States of Anæsthesia and Dream Life.*—If a patient be questioned as to what occupied his mind up to the moment of losing consciousness and again during the regaining of full consciousness, there will inevitably result a valuable collection of data regarding the waning and waxing states of consciousness. Many of these phenomena will be dream-like, and should like dreams be recorded with ample detail to make them intelligible. The nature of the impressions, whether visual or auditory, acted or felt, and most of all the connections between the dreams and the recent or remote experiences of waking are important items. Just as ordinary dreams become interesting when they are connected with normal experiences, so in the dreams of anæsthesia the patient alone can give adequate personal detail to give significance to the narrative.

3. *Other Points of Interest.*—The specific points enumerated are intended to make the matter definite rather than to limit the scope of the inquiry. Evidence is desired that bears in any degree of pertinence upon the general problem thus suggested. As additional points of interest may be mentioned the following: In cases of repeated anæsthesia after rather brief intervals, is it possible to elicit evidence that in the approaching or receding consciousness, details are remembered (or recallable by suggestion) which, though beyond the control of the waking consciousness, are thus shown to connect one stage of abnormal consciousness with another similarly caused. The analogous fact is that in hypnosis the subject will tell in a second hypnotization what happened while he was formerly hypnotized, but cannot recall in the waking interval; or again, in changes of personality the relapse into the altered personality will bring with it the control of memories of the last states of abnormal personality, which were not recallable in the normal state. Dreams and the actions of drugs show similar phenomena. Where records of this kind are available through anæsthesia, they should be recorded in detail, and a conclusive set of questionings and tests be made to elicit how far the two states are connected.

A further point of interest is the correlation of different types of mental states with different degrees of anæsthesia. For this purpose it is desirable that some physiological sign of the degree of anæsthesia be recorded as evidence in general of the depth of anæsthesia during which the mental phenomena were observed. The variations of susceptibility to an anæsthetic are such as to make it important to estimate the susceptibility in each case, as well as to give such general data as the age, sex, occupation, condition in life, physical state, temperament, purpose for which the anæsthetic was administered, length

of period under its influence, degree of nervous shock accompanying the same, and so on.

The general use to which the data will be placed will be that of formulating a consistent account and interpretation of the range of subconscious mental states, including simple states of distraction, absentmindedness, reverie, trance, hypnosis, dreams, the actions of drugs, alterations of personality, lapses of memory, states of confusion, and the reactions to anæsthetics. It is hoped that a sufficient series of data will be elicited by the present inquiry to throw important light upon processes as yet imperfectly understood, and the analogies of which to such artificially induced states as those accompanying anæsthesia are of especial importance. The psychologist has naturally but little opportunity to observe these phenomena and must thus appeal to those who are professionally engaged in their production, to step aside from their main interests to supply in a spirit of coöperation the data so valuable to students of a different and yet not unrelated science.

Full credit will be given to all contributions, and no direct or personal use will be made thereof in print without distinct permission. Those to whom this circular letter is addressed are hereby invited to send records of such observations and to further the purposes of this inquiry in such ways as may lie in their power. The undersigned will appreciate, both personally and professionally, favorable action upon this request.

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BOOKS RECEIVED FROM AUGUST 5 TO
SEPTEMBER 5.

- Essai sur l'hyperespace, le temps, la matière et l'énergie.* MAURICE BOUCHER. Paris, Alcan, 1905. Pp. 210.
- Saggi sulla teoria della conoscenza. Saggio secondo filosofia della metafisica.* COSMO GUASTELLA. Palermo, R. Sandron, 1905. 2 vols. Pp. 761, 472 + ccxxvi + 349.
- Dottrina di Rosmini sull'essenza della materia.* C. GUASTELLA. Publ. by the author, 1901. 2 fasc., pp. 20 + 17.
- Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie.* MARY WHITON CALKINS. Leipzig, Veit & Co. (Boston, C. A. Köhler, 149 Tremont St., agent), 1905. Pp. 80.
- J. G. Sulzer's Psychologie und die Anfänge der Dreivermögenslehre.* ANTON PALME. Berlin, W. Fussinger, 1905. Pp. 62.
- Du mode de transmission des idées. Conception matérialiste de l'intelligence humaine.* L. LEFÈVRE. Brussels, P. Weissenbruch, 1905. Pp. 51.
- Ophthalmic Neuro-myology.* G. C. SAVAGE. Nashville (Tenn.), The author, 1905. Pp. viii + 221.

NOTES AND NEWS.

THE following are taken from the press:

DR. ALOIS RIEHL, professor of philosophy at Halle, has accepted a call to Berlin.

DR. ALBERT LEFEVRE, of Tulane University, has been appointed professor of philosophy in the University of Virginia.

